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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Hector Navarro appeals from the order dismissing his petition for postconviction relief.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 1
In 2007, the state charged Navarro with lewd conduct with a child under
sixteen for having intercourse with his thirteen-year-old cousin, M.M., "on or
between the 1st day of May, 1995, and the 31 st day of August, 1995."2 (#34865
R., pp.55-56; PSI, p.2.) Navarro lived with M.M. and her family "from May 1995

to August 1995" and M.M. said, during that time, Navarro "tried to have sex with
[her] approximately five times, but he was not successful each time because
[she] would push him off her."
learning she was pregnant.

(PSI, p.2.)

(PSI, p.2.)

M.M. reported the offense after

DNA tests indicated a 99.9 percent

chance that Navarro was the father of M.M.'s child. (#34865 Tr., p.14, Ls.7-9;
PSI, p.2.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Navarro pied guilty to the lewd conduct
charge and the state agreed to recommend Navarro's sentence "run concurrent

1

The Idaho Supreme Court has entered an order taking judicial notice of the
"Transcript and Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 34865, STATE V.
NAVARRO." (Order Re: Judicial Notice, dated July 2, 2013.)
2

The state originally charged Navarro on February 14, 1996, and a warrant was
issued that same day. (#34865 R., p.23.) The delay in adjudicating the charge
appears to be due to the fact that Navarro was no longer in Idaho in 1996;
however, he was eventually extradited from a Texas prison in May 2007 and
returned to Idaho pursuant to a new warrant issued July 11, 2006. (PSI, p.2; see
Tr., p.38, Ls.3-21; #34865 R., pp.31-34, 37.) ·
1

with the sentence that he's currently serving in Texas" but otherwise "stand silent
at sentencing." (#34865 Tr., p.4, Ls.22-25, p.16, Ls.19-21.) The court imposed
a unified 25-year sentence with 12 ½ years fixed and ordered that it run
concurrent with Navarro's Texas sentence. 3 (#34865 R., pp.80-81.)

Navarro

filed a Rule 35 motion, which the court denied. (#34865 R., pp.82-85.) Navarro
appealed his sentence and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed.

State v.

Navarro, Docket No. 34865, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 543 (Ct. App.
7/23/09).

Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings
While his direct appeal was pending, Navarro filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming he pied guilty under the "misadvice [sic] of counsel."
(R., p.4.) Navarro alleged his conviction was based on his "inadmissible coerced

confession and/or the alleged victim's uncorroberated [sic] & false testimony"
and that the "state failed to present physical evidence linking [him] directly to the
alleged offense."

(R., p.4.)

Navarro also filed a supporting memorandum in

which he asserted counsel was ineffective for failing to files motions to (1) recuse
the judge; (2) dismiss "based on insufficient factual basis/insufficient evidence to
substantiate a conviction" or based on a "defective Indictment"; (3) suppress; and
(4) depose the victim, which would have allegedly revealed she "had previously
made similar false accusations" against Jose Bueno.

3

(R., pp.7-8.)

Navarro

In 2006, Navarro was sentenced to five years in prison for aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon after he "took his wife to the woods and held a knife to her
throat until she confessed she was having an affair." (PSI, pp.4-5)

2

further alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to "invoke the statute of
limitations retroactively" and in representing him at sentencing.

(R., pp.7, 14.)

Finally, Navarro asserted (1) the court committed "plain-error" by failing to
"conduct a Jackson-Denno hearing to determine 'if' [his] confession was in fact
given freely & intelligently" and by "adjudicating" his case despite an allegedly
"defective indictment" and expired statute of limitation; and (2) that he was being
subjected to "cruel and unusual punishment."

(R., p.8, 13-14 (capitalization

altered, brackets original).)
The state filed an answer, a motion requesting judicial notice of the
"records, exhibits, and/or transcripts" in Navarro's underlying criminal case, and a
motion for summary dismissal.

(R., pp.16-18, 28-45.)

At the hearing on the

state's motion for summary dismissal, the court appointed counsel to represent
Navarro and continued the matter. (R., pp.49-50, 53-54.) Several months later,
Navarro filed a response to the state's motion in which he requested summary
dismissal in his favor and asserted:
It was not until well after [his] conviction that he learned that
the victim in the case had previously accused her father, Jose
Bueno, of the same offense in Case Number 1996-6742-C on
August 20, 1996. That case was subsequently dismissed on
August 29, 1996. Mr. Navarro contends that the State did not
disclose in its discovery that the victim had accused another
person, nor did his attorney learn of this accusation through any
attempts to investigate the victim. Mr. Navarro has no knowledge if
Mr. Bueno ever underwent D.N.A testing.
Mr. Navarro also learned after his conviction that the victim
in the case had made disclosures to Melodia Eloy Reyes that "she
lied about Mr. Navarro raping her because she was pregnant and
scared of her father, [and] that Mr. Navarro never touched her
inappropriately.

3

(R., pp.69-70 (second brackets original).)
In the "Argument" section of his response, Navarro asserted an entirely
new "claim"4 - a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), based on the
state's failure to disclose "that the victim in the case had accused her father of
the offense" - and reframed his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to
depose the victim into a "claim" that counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct
a complete investigation that would have allegedly uncovered the prior
accusation, which information would have changed Navarro's decision to plead
guilty.

(R., pp.70-71.) At a subsequent hearing, Navarro withdrew the claims

alleged in his petition and supporting memorandum 5 and indicated his intent to
pursue only the claims asserted in his motion for summary dismissal; the state
did not object and the court scheduled the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
(Tr., p.14, L.22-p.16, L.18; R. pp.79-80.)
At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the court took judicial notice of
"the underlying criminal file in 1996-1380C and its contents ... , the change of
plea and sentencing transcripts," and "portions of the file in State versus Jose

4

Post-conviction claims are supposed to be alleged in the petition, not in
supporting memorandums, responsive pleadings or motions for summary
disposition. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004) ("Idaho
Code section 19-4903 mandates that the application for post-conviction relief
'specifically set forth the grounds upon which the application is based . . .. All
grounds for relief ... must be raised in [the defendant's] original, supplemental,
or amended application.' I.C. § 19-4908.") Nevertheless, the parties can
expressly or impliedly consent to try a claim not alleged in the petition. Monahan
v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008).
5

Indeed, Navarro could not legitimately pursue any claim based on an
involuntary confession because, although he pied guilty, he did not confess to
law enforcement. (See Tr., p.44, L.8 - p.46, L.8.)
4

Maria Bueno 96-6742 from Canyon County."6 (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-16.) Following
the evidentiary hearing, the court entered an Order Denying Post-Conviction
Relief from which Navarro filed a timely notice of appeal. 7 (R., pp.100-104.)

6

The "portions of the file in State versus Jose Maria Bueno 96-67 42 from
Canyon County" are not included in the record on appeal.

As of the filing of this brief, it does not appear the district court has entered a
final judgment as required by Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(a) and 58(a);
therefore, this Court may wish to temporarily remand the case and suspend the
appeal to allow for the entry of a final judgment.
7

5

ISSUES
Navarro states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Navarro's petition for
post-conviction relief because he established that the
prosecutor's failure to disclose the case against the cousin's
father violated due process?
2. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Navarro's petition for
post-conviction relief because he established that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel?
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.5.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
Has Navarro failed to show the district court erred in denying relief on his
Brady claim and his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
independently discover the evidence he claims was withheld by the state in
violation of Brady?

6

ARGUMENT
Navarro Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of PostConviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Navarro contends the district court erred in denying relief on both his

Brady claim and his related ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Appellant'
Brief, pp.5-11.)

Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence

presented show Navarro failed to meet his burden of proving he is entitled to
relief on either claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which her claim is based.
Idaho Criminal Rule 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135,
141 (1986). A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of
proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d
964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). Further, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight
to be given to the testimony are matters within the discretion of the trial court.
Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982).

C.

Navarro Has Failed To Show He Met His Burden Of Establishing A Brady
Violation
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding

and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing,

by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State,

7

144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained the legal standards applicable to
an alleged Brady violation as follows:
Due process requires all material exculpatory evidence
known to the State or in its possession be disclosed to the
defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10
L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d
794, 797 (2000). "[T]here is 'no constitutional requirement that the
prosecutor make a complete and detailed accounting to defense of
all police investigatory work on a case."' State v. Horn, 101 Idaho
192, 195, 610 P.2d 551, 554 (1980) (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 408
U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 2568, 33 L.Ed.2d 706, 713 (1972)).
"There are three essential components of a true Brady violation:
the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully
or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1939, 144 L.Ed.2d
286, 291 (1999). Impeachment evidence should be viewed in the
same manner as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 490
(1985); Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 796, 10 P.3d 742, 745
(2000). However, the United States Constitution does not require
the State to disclose material impeachment information prior to
entering a plea agreement with the defendant. United States v.
Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 633, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 2455, 2457, 153
L.Ed.2d 586, 595, 597 (2002). One of the reasons behind the
Court's holding is that "impeachment information is special in
relation to the fairness of a trial not in respect to whether a plea is
voluntary[.]" Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629, 122 S.Ct. at 2455, 153 L.Ed.2d
at 595.
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64, 106 P.3d 376, 390 (2004).
Because Navarro pied guilty, he may only pursue a Brady claim if the
evidence he contends was withheld wa? exculpatory rather than impeaching
since the state had no obligation to disclose impeachment information prior to
Navarro's guilty plea. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629; Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 64, 106 P.3d

8

at 390. Thus, to the extent Navarro's argument relies on any impeachment value
the evidence may have had, his claim fails. (Appellant's Brief, p.6 ("In addition to
the impeaching nature of this evidence .... "), p.8 ("In light of the ... evidentiary
significance of the withheld evidence both as impeachment and exculpatory
evidence, .... ).) Even if Navarro contends the evidence was exculpatory, his
claim still fails.
"Exculpatory evidence has been defined as evidence which tends to clear
an accused of alleged guilt, excuses the actions of the accused, or tends to
reduce punishment." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 370, 941 P.2d 337, 342
(Ct. App. 1997) (citing State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408,411,816 P.2d 364,367
(Ct. App. 1991 )).

The evidence Navarro presented at the post-conviction

evidentiary hearing regarding the prior charge against Bueno does not satisfy
this definition.
Navarro testified that Jose Bueno, who is his uncle and M.M.'s father, was
also charged with lewd conduct in relation to M.M. "during the same time period"
in "Case Number 1996-6742." (Tr., p.26, L.19 - p.27, L.15.) The prosecutor
who handled Navarro's criminal case testified she was unaware of the charges
against Bueno when she was handling Navarro's case but stated her
understanding that "it's the same victim" and the time period alleged in Buena's
case was a "continuing course of conduct between 1989 and 1996." (Tr., p.52,
L.22 - p.53, L.25.) The prosecutor also testified it was her "understanding" the

9

case against Bueno was dismissed at the preliminary hearing. 8 (Tr., p.54, Ls.16.)

The mere fact that Bueno was also charged with committing lewd conduct
against M.M. in 1996 does not alone "tend[] to clear" Navarro of guilt, excuse his
actions, or reduce his punishment, especially since the case against Bueno was
dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage, nine days after it was filed. 9
Osborne, 130 Idaho at 370, 941 P.2d at 342. Navarro presented no evidence
establishing the basis for the charge against Bueno, why it was dismissed, or
how the filing of the case against Bueno exculpates him in any way. Instead,
Navarro contends the "accusation" against Bueno "weakens both pieces of the
state's evidence," presumably referring to M.M.'s allegations and the paternity
test. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) According to Navarro, "as the young cousin who

8

The prosecutor who requested dismissal of Buena's case was a different
prosecutor than the one assigned to Navarro's case and who testified at the
post-conviction evidentiary hearing. (See Tr., p.54, Ls.11-13.)
As previously noted, although the district court took judicial notice of "portions
of the file in State versus Jose Maria Bueno 96-6742 from Canyon County" (Tr.,
p.21, L.15 - p.22, L.6), those documents are not included in the record on
appeal. The only document from Buena's case that is included in the record is
the Order Appointing the Public Defender, which was admitted as Exhibit 1 at the
evidentiary hearing, and has been augmented to the record pursuant to
Navarro's motion. In any event, the Idaho Repository shows that the state filed a
lewd conduct charge against Bueno on August 20, 1996, and the charge was
dismissed on August 29, 1996.
For the Court's convenience, the case
information from the Idaho Repository is attached hereto as Appendix A.
9

10

had moved out of state," he "was a far safer target on whom to pin the
pregnancy than the father" and "the possibility that [his] uncle [Bueno] fathered
the child places significant doubt on the DNA's conclusion of 99.9% probability of
paternity." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Both of Navarro's arguments are flawed.
To the extent, if any, the evidence tends to show M.M.'s motive to "pin the
pregnancy" on anyone in her family, the evidence is merely impeaching. More
importantly, Navarro's assertion makes no sense given that Navarro was
charged by Criminal Complaint on February 14, 1996 (#34865 R., pp.5-6), and
Bueno was not charged until six months later on August 20, 1996 (Appendix A).
If M.M. had, as Navarro suggests, simply decided to "pin the pregnancy" on the
"safer target," there would be no reason for her to subsequently implicate her
father.

Notably, Navarro failed to call M.M. or any other witness in order to

establish the theory he advances, thereby failing to provide any evidence to
support his allegations.
Although Navarro filed an affidavit from Melodia Reyes in support of his
petition in which Reyes claims M.M. told him in 2003 that "she had lied about Mr.
Navarro raping her because she was pregnant and scared of her father" and that
Navarro "never touched her inappropriately," this affidavit is hearsay and was not
admitted as evidence at the evidentiary hearing. 10 See Loveland v. State, 141
Idaho 933, 936, 120 P.3d 751, 754 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Unless introduced into
evidence, pleadings are not evidence."). Moreover, it does not implicate Bueno

10

Reyes' affidavit was not included in the Clerk's Record. Contemporaneous
with this brief, the state has filed a motion to augment the record with the
affidavit.
11

as an offender; it merely alleges M.M. said she was "scared of her father," which
is not an unexpected emotion from a pregnant teenager. This is consistent with
information from the underlying criminal file, which the court took judicial notice
of at the beginning of the evidentiary hearing.

Specifically, the PSI materials

include the report prepared by the investigating officer in 1995 at which time
M.M. told the detective she had not told her father at the time of the offense

because her "father gets violent (not towards her or her mother) and she was
afraid of what he might do." (Canyon County Sheriff's Office Case Report, p.1
(attached to PSI).)

The most reasonable interpretation of this is that M.M.

delayed disclosure because she was protecting Navarro from her father.
The PSI also includes a report from July 11, 2006, when law enforcement
reinitiated contact with M.M. "to see if she was interested in continuing the case"
as it was still pending and "was coming up on the court calendar for dismissal.
(Report of Officer M. Tucker, p.1 (attached to PSI).) M.M. told the officer "she
was still interested in wanting the case pursued" after which law enforcement
was able to locate Navarro and serve him with an arrest warrant and arrange his
extradition to Idaho. (Id. at pp.1-2; see #34865 R., pp.27-37.)
Thus, contrary to Reyes' hearsay affidavit that was never offered as
evidence, the information the court took judicial notice of demonstrates M.M.
maintained from 1995, when she first reported the lewd conduct, to 2006 when
Navarro was extradited to Idaho to answer to the charge, that Navarro was the
perpetrator.

Navarro failed to present any evidence that the charges filed

12

against Bueno in 1996 and dismissed nine days later were in any way
exculpatory.
As for Navarro's argument that "the possibility that [his] uncle [Bueno]
fathered the child places significant doubt on the DNA's conclusion of 99.9%
probability of paternity" (Appellant's Brief, p.8), Navarro failed to present any
evidence to support that theory either. The lab report, which was admitted as
evidence, states: "The alleged father, HECTOR NAVARRO JR, cannot be
excluded as the biological father of the child, ... , since they share genetic
markers.

Using the above systems, the probability of paternity is 99.99%, as

compared to an untested, unrelated man of the Hispanic population." (Exhibit 2
(Augmentation).)

However, Navarro presented no DNA evidence from Bueno

and no scientific testimony to support the proposition that Bueno would have the
same or greater probability of paternity because he is related to Navarro or that
the probability of Navarro's own paternity would have changed. Navarro instead
claims the mere fact that Bueno is related is sufficient to "place[ ] significant
doubt" on the 99.99% probability determination that Navarro fathered M.M.'s
child.

(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) This argument is not supported by any actual

evidence.

It was Navarro's burden to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence each element of his Brady claim. Navarro does not meet that burden

by positing speculative theories about what M.M. may have done or what some
unknown DNA testing might show.
In addition to his failure to show the case filed against Bueno was
exculpatory evidence that should have been disclosed, Navarro also failed to

13

prove the prejudice prong of his Brady claim. To show prejudice, Navarro was
required to establish the fact that Bueno was charged with lewd conduct
involving M.M. six months after Navarro was charged was "material" to his case
and, more precisely, his decision to plead guilty. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282
(the prejudice component of a Brady claim must satisfy the "materiality" inquiry).
"[E]vidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (citation and quotation
omitted).

"On a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test of materiality (i.e.,

prejudice) is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the state's
failure to produce the information, the defendant would not have entered the
plea, but instead would have insisted on going to trial." Roeder v. State, 144
Idaho 415, 418, 162 P.3d 794, 797 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Gardner, 126
Idaho 428, 436, 855 P.2d 1144, 1152 (Ct. App. 1994)). This Court "employ[s] an
objective assessment, based in part on the persuasiveness of the withheld
information, as to whether the particular defendant and his counsel would have
insisted on going to trial."

~

at 418-19, 162 P.3d at 797-98. As part of this

assessment, the Court will "evaluate whether a reasonable defendant ... , after
obtaining the withheld information, would be convinced that an acquittal (or a
conviction for a lesser offense) was a realistic possibility which ought not to be
foreclosed by a guilty plea."

~

at 419, 162 P.3d at 798. The Court does not,

however, "take into account" a defendant's subjective statements about the
likelihood of not pleading guilty if the undisclosed information had been available.

14

Js.t

The district court correctly concluded Navarro failed to show the Bueno case

was material. (Tr., p.94, Ls.19-20.)
Navarro presented no evidence to support the conclusion that there is a
reasonable possibility that a defendant in Navarro's position who knew that a
lewd conduct charge involving the same victim was filed against another person
six months after the defendant was charged, but was dismissed for unknown
reasons, would be convinced that the mere fact of that dismissed charge would
have resulted in an acquittal or conviction of a lesser included offense.

M.M.

maintained that Navarro "raped" her and attempted to have inappropriate sexual
contact with her on several occasions. Navarro offers no basis for believing that
the existence of a dismissed criminal charge involving the same victim would
have even been admissible had he proceeded to trial.

At best, Navarro may

have been able to cross-examine M.M. regarding the nature of that charge,

I.RE. 412, demonstrating that his claim is really based on the impeachment
value of the evidence, which is not a valid Brady claim in light of Navarro's guilty
plea. Ruiz, supra.
Regardless, having failed to provide any evidence regarding the nature of
the charge against Bueno or why it was dismissed, Navarro failed to satisfy his
burden

of proving

materiality, especially in light of Navarro's repeated

acknowledgments that he had sex with M.M., not only as part of his guilty plea
(#34865 Tr., p.14, L.3 - p.16, L.11) but also to the presentence investigator, to
whom he admitted guilt but claimed the intercourse was consensual (PSI, p.2),
and in his Rule 35 motion where he reiterated that he had consensual sex with
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the victim (#34865 R., pp.82-84). Certainly the knowledge that one committed
the alleged offense is always a factor a reasonable defendant takes into
consideration when deciding whether to plead guilty.
Navarro, however, argues "[b]ecause [he] only derived a limited benefit
from the plea agreement, he need show that the withheld evidence held less
significance than in a case where the defendant derived significant benefit by
way

of

reduced

recommendations."

or

dismissed

charges

(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

and

favorable

Navarro is incorrect.

sentencing
What the

Court of Appeals has said in this regard is that "any benefit derived by [a
defendant] from the guilty plea is a significant factor inasmuch as a plea may be
heavily motivated by reduced exposure to additional charges and criminal
penalties."

Roeder, 144 Idaho at 419, 162 P.3d at 798.

A petitioner is not

relieved of his duty to prove materiality by claiming the benefit of his plea
agreement was not significant. Beyond that, Navarro understates the benefit of
the plea agreement. Because Navarro was only charged with a single offense,
the state obviously could not dismiss any charges as part of the agreement. The
state did, however, agree to "stand silent" with respect to a sentence
recommendation and agreed to recommend Navarro's sentence run concurrent
with the sentence he was serving in Texas even though the state could have
requested a sentence up to life, I. C. § 18-1508, but did not despite the fact that
Navarro had three other felony convictions and his offense against M.M. resulted
in the pregnancy of a 13-year-old child. That Navarro has now decided the plea
agreement was of "limited benefit" does not make it so.
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Navarro failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was
entitled to post-conviction relief on his Brady claim.
D.

Navarro Failed To Meet His Burden Of Proving Counsel was
Ineffective In Failing To Independently Discover The Prior
Dismissed Case Against Bueno

In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a postconviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting
prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v.

Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).

An attorney's

performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson
v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon
v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowgerv. State, 132
Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). The United States Supreme
Court has recently reiterated:
Surmounting Strick/ands high bar is never an easy task. An
ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules
of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and
so the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care,
lest intrusive post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very
adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citations and quotations
omitted).
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"This Court applies the Strickland test when determining whether a
defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea
process."

Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011)

(citations omitted).

"When a defendant alleges some deficiency in counsel's

advice regarding a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
(quotations and citations omitted).

kl

at 621, 262 P.3d at 264

"Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of

claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)).
Navarro asserts: "Even if the state was not obliged to disclose that Mr.
Navarro's alleged victim accused her father, trial counsel had a duty to discover
that information, especially considering trial counsel's testimony that he had
access to the father's old criminal case." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) The district
court correctly concluded Navarro failed to establish counsel was ineffective.
When Navarro pied guilty to lewd conduct in 2007, he was represented by
Scott Fouser who, at the time, had the Canyon County Public Defender contract.
(#34865 Tr., pp.3-16; Tr., p.61, L.14 - p.62, L.3.) However, Fouser was not the
public defender for Canyon County in 1995 or 1996 when the state charged
Bueno, who was also represented by the public defender's office, nor did he
work for the public defender at that time.

(Tr., p.61, Ls.20-24, p.76, Ls.5-7;

Exhibit 1 (Augmentation); Appendix A.)

Nevertheless, when Fouser was
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awarded the public defender contract in 1997, he received the files from the
previous public defender, Van Bishop. (Tr., p.76, Ls.15-25.)
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Fouser testified he did not
remember being aware that M.M. "had made similar accusations" against Bueno.
(Tr., p.69, Ls.13-20.)

Fouser also testified that, even assuming Bishop

transferred a file from the Bueno case to him when he took over the public
defender contract, there would be no reason for him to look for a file he did not
know existed. (Tr., p.82, L.24 - p.83, L.4.) Navarro claims the failure to do so
was deficient, asserting counsel had an obligation to look for a file he did not
know of simply because he supposedly had "access" to it.

(Appellant's Brief,

p.10.) This assertion is not supported by the evidence or logic.
That Fouser received files from Bishop does not mean those files included
the one pertaining to the 1996 criminal case against Bueno.

There was no

evidence presented that Bishop actually maintained a file on the dismissed case
against Bueno or that Fouser actually received such a file. Therefore, there is no
evidence that Fouser actually had access to it - only the theoretical possibility
that he could have. Even if Fouser had access, Navarro fails to explain why it
would be deficient for an attorney to fail to look through all case files on the offchance that he might discover one that includes an allegation of lewd conduct by
the same victim as the one identified in a pending criminal case. See Rompilla v.
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) ("the duty to investigate does not force defense
lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up; reasonably
diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further
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investigation would be a waste"); Mahaffey v. Page, 151 F.3d 671, 685 (ih Cir.
1998), vacated in part, 162 F.3d 481 (ih Cir. 1999) ("reasonable investigation
does not mandate a scorch-the-earth strategy, a requirement that would fail to
consider the limited time and resources that defense lawyers have in preparing");
Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9 th Cir. 1998) (internal citations
and quotations omitted) ( "While a lawyer is under a duty to make reasonable
investigations, a lawyer may make a reasonable decision that particular
investigations are unnecessary. To determine the reasonableness of a decision
not to investigate, the court must apply a heavy measure of deference to
counsel's judgments.").
Even if the Sixth Amendment demanded such a potentially futile exercise
by counsel, Navarro failed to establish any prejudice resulting from Fouser's
failure to search all prior public defender files in his possession in an effort to
uncover a case file unknown to him that may or may not be useful. As previously
noted, Navarro failed to provide any evidence of the nature of the allegation
against Bueno, why it was dismissed, or how it would have benefitted him had he
gone to trial. Even Fouser would not concede, without more information, that it
would have necessarily made a difference in how the case was resolved had he
discovered the state filed and later dismissed a case against Bueno. (Tr., p.73,
L.18 - p.74, L.22.)

Navarro failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice.

Compare People v. Mestas, 2013 WL 3809387 *6 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 2013) ("Here,
there is no showing of prejudice. He asserts that, if trial counsel had been more
diligent, 'more information regarding the complaining witnesses['] past sexual
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knowledge and conduct would have come before the jury." This is mere
speculation. It assumes that, if trial counsel had done more investigation, she
would have discovered facts that the trial court would have found admissible. It
further assumes that such unknown facts would have been of a nature to
undermine the jury's confidence in the victims' testimony. We will not assume
there are such facts or that the trial court would have exercised its discretion to
admit such unknown facts. Therefore, the defendant has failed to establish that
he would have obtained a better result absent trial counsel's alleged
deficiency.").
Navarro's self-serving assertion that he would not have pied guilty had he
known only that a case was filed against Bueno (without knowing anything else
about it) is not rational under the circumstances. Padilla, supra. Navarro failed
to establish counsel was ineffective as a result of his failure to discover the
dismissed charge against Bueno.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
dismissal of Navarro's petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 23 rd day of August 2013.

JESSIC
Deputy
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